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The reception of Jürgen Habermas’s (1962) early work on public sphere, especially in anglophone
media studies, has routinely been characterised by three misunderstandings and limitations. The
first is concerned with neglecting Habermas’, admittedly perfunctory but still fundamental, idea of
post-liberal democracy stemming from his redefining social organisations as the basis of a
revitalised public sphere. Secondly, it has not been observed that in the early 1960s Habermas did
not consider public sphere as part of civil society, defined, along with Hegel and Marx, as the field
of individual autonomy encompassed by egoistic economic calculations – a mixing up of things
made understandable by the post-Marxist athmosphere prevailing in the 1990s and 2000s. Finally,
the basic conceptual innovation the young Habermas introduces, namely, the distinction between
two kinds of public sphere – political and cultural – has been ignored, leading to misplaced
critiques of his overall conception of the place of public communication in modern societies. The
first  issue  is  relevant  in  trying  to  figure  out  what  communicative  forms  radical  democracy,  or
socialism, could take; the second, in theorising the limits capitalism imposes on both democracy
and public sphere; and the third, in working out the relations, so dear to the Frankfurt School and
Cultural Studies alike, between the political and the cultural both constituted and mediated by
communication, mass and other. In the following I will take up the third issue, intending to
highlight some of the theoretical resources still comparatively untapped in Habermas’s widely but
not always so carefully read book. 1
Put briefly, the context to which Habermas reacted with Strukturwandel at the turn of
the 1960s was three-fold: methodological, social and political.2 Habermas wanted to continue the
work that had been been done within the Frankfurt School, by combining results both from the
aesthetic approach of Theodor W. Adorno and Herbert Marcuse and from the political theory of
Franz Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer. The major issue tackled with by the first generation of
Frankfurters was concerned with the ‘great transformation’ (Polanyi 1957) of the 19th-century
1 For reasons of convenience and cultural background, I will refer to Habermas (1962) as Strukturwandel.
2liberal society into the post-liberal one of the 20th century. Before Habermas no one had within
Critical Theory attempted at such an overall historical narrative of and theoretical explanation to
how 20th-century social arrangements were produced. Habermas’s main focus on these was
political, motivated by the fate of democracy in postwar West Germany, as seen through the eyes
of someone who, in line with the old working class movement, thought that socialism was about
completing the project of emancipation and self-rule that the bourgeoisie, with the new liberal
order safely established, had abandoned. What Strukturwandel, then, provides us with is a theory
of bourgeois-liberal society with political intent, the interest of which for media research resides in
the central place Habermas accords to the public sphere and the institutions of communication.
Part of the difficulty of reading Strukturwandel, at least in post-1970s media studies
outside of German-language scholarship, stems from its overall structure and multidisciplinary
methodology. As an instance of Western Marxism of the Frankfurt School type, Strukturwandel
examines the development of the bourgeois society not only in terms of its economic base but also
in those of its so-called superstructural aspects, of which public communication is the most
relevant for Habermas’s analytical and normative purposes. More specifically, the nature of the
public realm serves Habermas as a conceptual tool for characterising social and political
formations in Western history, which he unsurprisingly separates into four developmental phases:
Antiquity (with the agonistic public sphere), Middle Ages (with the representative public sphere),
Bourgeois Society (with the liberal public sphere) and Post-Bourgeois Society (with two options:
the dominant mass-cultural public sphere and the emergent organisational public sphere). In
addition to this historicist  strand of theorising, taking Ancient Greece as the major starting point
and frame of reference, Habermas’s choice of comprehensive methodology, too, belies his
commitment to the Hegelian-Marxist tradition. Accordingly, it is hard to specify the disciplinary
singularity of Strukturwandel.  It  is  a  work  of  social  and  political  theory,  combining  historical
sociology, political philosophy, democratic theory, social history and cultural history, media
history included. Instead of linking himself explicitly to the Hegelian lineage, Habermas describes
in the Preface this kind of approach as an attempt at revitalising the ancient discipline of politics.
One may then say that Habermas’s idea of knowledge, underlying Strukturwandel but  also  his
later  works,  consists  of  giving  a  rigorously  modern  shape  to  ancient  concerns  with  social  and
political life, centring on the significance of public life to democracy (cf. Habermas 1963; Cohen
1979).
2 Cf. Habermas’s (2009) own account which describes in greater detail methodological influences on his work.
3Given Habermas’s problem situation at the turn of the 1960s coupled with the
structural and methodological nature of Strukturwandel, it is easier to approach his idea of dual
public sphere – and to appreciate the difficulties in devoting attention to it in the media studies of
recent decades.3 I will shortly, first, describe the relation of both the cultural and the political
public spheres in the work, and, then, analyse in some detail the foundations and functions of the
former.
The bourgeois society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft) inaugurated by the late-18th-century
political  revolutions  is  defined  by  Habermas  as  the  separation  of  state  (Staat) and society
(Gesellschaft) as a result of  the emergence of civil society or capitalist economy based on private
property and commodity production (bürgerliche Gesellschaft in the narrow sense). Habermas
complements this standard Marxist definition with two social domains, family and public sphere,
outside of state and civil society, ending up with a four-realm depiction of the society in the large
sense. Given Habermas’s leaning towards dialectical reasoning, it is, however, incomplete to stick
to analytically separate distinctions only. Namely, the function of the public sphere is to mediate
between the three other domains, especially state and civil society plus individuals in relation to
humanity (the individual as homme), in relation to civil society (the individual as bourgeois) and
in relation to state (the individual as citoyen).  With  the  help  of  these  distinctions  the  relation
between the political and the cultural public spheres can be illuminated.
In the bourgeois or liberal society from the late 18th century to the late 19th century, it
was the function of the political public sphere to mediate the political society of state with the
non-polital civil society of economically autonomous private entrepreneurs. What politics was
principally about was regulating the conflicts the anarchic capitalist markets were bound to
provoke. The medium of this regulation was public opinion, which was formed by individual
private-property holders acting collectively in public, namely by conversing in cafés and debating
in newspapers. The special feature of the liberal political public sphere, in contrast to the classical
idea  of  politics  in  Antiquity  as  described  by  Habermas,  is  that  it  is  a  publicly  available  arena
where private matters are discussed among individuals. The political public sphere is, then, at the
same time both public, in the sense of addressing the common good (res publica), and private, in
the sense of forming an arena outside of state where the freedom of speech reigns. In order to
bridge the gap in the political public square between the public virtues of the citizen and the
private ones of the private-property holder or the bourgeois, Habermas introduces the cultural
public sphere as a realm where political subjects are culturally educated. This political initiation,
3 As a representative and widely-known title which fails to inspect the duality of the public realm in  Strukturwandel,
see, eg, Dahlgren (1995).
4following German Idealism as analysed within the Frankfurt School by Marcuse (1937), takes the
form of aesthetic education by which solitary individuals are raised to the level of common
humanity. In terms of culture and mass media, the relevant channels for this are non-narrative and
narrative arts, especially the novel, the bourgeois art form par excellence.
In his insistence on the primary relevance of culture for political participation, early
Habermas anticipates Cultural Studies, even if his solution is different. Both Habermas and
Cultural Studies argue for the cultural constitution of polical subjects via communication, mass
and other, but Habermas’s description of the liberal model of the cultural public sphere, the only
one he seems to react emphatically to, reveals his commitment to the tradition of
Bildungsbürgertum. I will dissect it into three aspects which together characterise the classical
model of the cultural public sphere as envisioned by Habermas in Strukturwandel.
While the political side of the public sphere is concerned with regulating the outcome
of private transactions in civil society, the cultural side centers on the production of the required
commonality between private desires. What such a liberal public culture basically needs is the
spirit  of  reciprocity  or  humanity.  It  is  only  through identifying  themselves  with  the  mankind,  or
assuming that all human beings are essentially equal, that the private egos can rise above their
singularity and find solidarity with their fellow men and women. In order to make this feasible,
Habermas offers three criteria of the cultural facet of the classical public sphere as the springboard
for political participation.
First, people must orient themselves towards the public, or they have to be interested
in  other  people  outside  of  their  own  narrow  sphere  of  life.  In  other  words,  a  world  is  required
where one lives not only with his or her family members, relatives and friends, but keeps company
– real or imaginary – also with strangers. It is the singular specificity of the modern, or bourgeois,
world to give rise, via public culture and mass communication among other things, to this kind of
secondary identifications (Žižek 1997). This explains also why aesthetics, developed during the
18th century as a theory of the new culturally based subjectivity, gains such eminence (cf. Ferry
1990). It is then no surprise that Habermas illustrates his second aspect with the case of the novel.
The novel is the paradigmatic case of the cultural public sphere towards which the subjects,
especially  women,  orient  themselves  and  with  the  help  of  whose  role  models  or  imaginary
companions they can develop their individual identities. Narrative art in general, but especially in
its literary fictive forms, is, in this tradition, the ideal means by which we can gain access to
others’ lives and learn humanity (Booth 1988; Nussbaum 1995). But there is also another aspect to
the kind of secondary life opened up by aesthetic communication, that is peculiar to the liberal
cultural  sphere  emphasised  by  Habermas.  It  is  the  discourse  of  criticism.  For  it  is  not  only  by
5reading novels but also by reading critical commentaries on and by having discussions about them
that subjects interpret their needs and learn to accommodate themselves to the needs of others.
That is, cultural criticism functions as a mediator between private media reception and public
cultural concerns. In the cultural public sphere people act first and foremost as spectators, that is,
as receivers of cultural artefacts produced by others, and this is its third main characteristic.
Spectatorship means distanciation, which makes reflection possible. Reading novels or listening to
music cultivates one’s cognitive, affective and volitive capacities not in a direct confrontation with
the necessities of practical life but in a reflective mode. It is in this way that the cultural public
sphere participates in the aesthetic, moral and intellectual education of man, prepairing citizens for
political participation.
Fundamentally, Habermas’s idea of the duality of public sphere is based on the classic
distinction between vita activa and vita contemplativa, that is, active versus contemplative life. On
one hand, in discussing, directly among themselves or via newspapers, burning issues of the day
people take actively part in the constitution of the public opinion by which they as citizens try to
govern the course of the society. On the other hand, in reading novels or other imaginary
renderings of the human condition they contemplate in an intuitive or more reflected manner their
wishes and needs, pleasures and anxieties – that is, their identities as persons. In is in this sense
that the political subjects are, in Strukturwandel, culturally produced. One of the corollaries of this
is that when the cultural public realm, or the cultural production of political subjects, changes so
does the character of the political public sphere itself. In fact, Habermas, not unlike the tradition of
Bildungsbürgertum, suggests that it is the substitution of the cultural public sphere of the literary
type, distinctive of the hayday of the bourgeoisie, for the one of the audiovisual type prevalent in
the 20th century, that illustrates the decline of the bourgeois era. Habermas’s work has been
criticised from many angles, with which any attempt at defending its basic conceptual, theoretical
and methodological solutions has to cope. Using Strukturwandel’s four-dimensional idea of the
bourgeois  society  as  the  frame  of  reference,  I  will  sort  out  four  main  avenues  of  counter-
arguments the work has aroused: Marxist, functionalist, feminist and culturalist.4 They all blame
Strukturwandel for different omissions or shortcomings.
 For  Marxists  (eg,  Sørensen  1975),  Habermas’s  main  fault  lies  in  his  theory  of  civil
society or capitalism which does not cut deep enough. Accepting too much of the heritage of the
German Idealism, Habermas wrongly supposes that the institutions of the public sphere supported
by mass media could withstand the capitalist logic of concentration, commodification and other
4 Peter Uwe Hohendahl (1978) presents a summary, organised differently from what I propose here, of early critiques of
Strukturwandel.
6such inevitable consequences. Instead, they are mainly means of socialising people to reproduce
capitalist production relations. For functionalists (eg, Luhmann 1970), Habermas’s idea of the
political public sphere, based on public opinion as a way of regulating state and administration, is
hopelessly out of tune with the functional differentiation and complexity of modern societies. As a
result of this new phase of social evolution, no rational discussion through media is possible, and
politics merely assumes the form of both interfering with and reacting to what kind of knowledge
mass media distribute. For feminists (eg, Landes 1994), the way Strukturwandel grounds the
public sphere on the kind of family relations, based on intimacy, humanity and equality, which set
the bourgeoisie apart from its predecessors, is dismissive of the patriarchic power relations they
inherently support. The ideology of humanity and of equal access to the public square is but a
cover for male domination. For culturalists (eg, Dahlgren 1995), early Habermas has no
understanding for popular forms of the public sphere, privileging, in an Adornian fashion, high
culture  and  its  elitist  modes  of  address  and  genres  of  expression.  Politically  this  turns
Strukturwandel into a reactionary treatise which contributes to hindering popular sovereignty
rather than to enhancing it.
Even if all of these critical strategies are relevant for assessing early Habermas’s
notion of public sphere I shall, following my main lead, concentrate only on the culturalist line,
drawing attention to two alternatives – one broadly taken non-Habermasian (Cultural Studies as
exemplified by Alan McKee 2005) and the other Habermasian (the cultural sociology of Jeffrey C.
Alexander 2006) – to conceptualise the relevance of public culture to political participation. What
I  am aiming  at  is,  by  way of  comparing  two interpretations  of Strukturwandel,  a  review of  the
extent  to  which  the  project  of Strukturwandel, as far as its cultural conception of politics is
concerned, can still be defended as a model for mass communication studies.5 Because of its huge
popularity in media studies, the choice of a Cultural Studies alternative speaks for itself, whereas a
work  coming  more  from  the  tradition  of  cultural  sociology  provides  us  with  a  less  known  but
illustrative contrast (for background, see also Alexander & Smith 2003).
McKee (2005), which can be taken as a representative sample of the conceptions of
public sphere held within Cultural Studies, is organised as en explicit commentary on and critique
of Habermas, Strukturwandel included. McKee is highly critical of Habermas, characteristically
mixes up many things in Strukturwandel6 but  summarises  in  a  polemical  tone  some of  the  basic
5 Cf. Klaus Bruhn Jensen (1995, 58) who considers Strukturwandel as ”the best framework for a comprehensive
analysis of culture and communication in modern Western societies”.
6 One of these confusions is the assertion that the separation of private and public spheres is essentially liberal. In fact,
the city states of Ancient Greece made the same distinction. It comes as no surprise that, for McKee, Aristotle is a
liberal philosopher.
7issues  relevant  here.  Alexander  (2006)  is  an  ambitious  attempt  at  a  new  theory  of  civil  society,
dealing only comparatively briefly, given the some 800 pages of the book, with Habermas and
Strukturwandel.7 In many ways the main thrust of Alexander’s theorising is, however, not very far
from what Habermas wanted to accomplish with Strukturwandel but then dropped from his
agenda. To make the argument short, I will only consider the three aspects of the bourgeois
cultural public sphere analysed by early Habermas and screen them in the light of a comparison
between McKee and Alexander. For the comparison, I will rephrase the issues as those of (1) the
universality of public sphere, (2) the status of narrative art and cultural criticism, and (3) the
spectatorial public.
(1) The bourgeoisie, in young Habermas’s reading, could conceive its particular
political interests, namely, the regulation of an economy based on commodity production, only
with the help of the ideology of humanity. It was the task of the family, existing beyond the reach
of both the political obligations of the state and the economic imperatives of the civil society, to
educate family members to reciprocal relations based on love and caring. In this way, individuals
could  find  their  common  humanity  but  only  within  the  intimate  sphere.  It  was  the  task  of  the
cultural  public  realm  to  add  a  social  and  collective  dimension  to  this.  As  novels  as  the
paradigmatic bourgeois narrative art, replacing earlier epic forms, took their subject matter from
the new kind of private feelings and relations with which people had to cope with,  reading them
became a way of participating in the collective construction of a new subjectivity orienting
towards universal humanism.
McKee considers the universal humanism of Bildungsbürgertum, which Habermas
thinks is not only an ideology but also a genuine utopia, as a modern prejudice, privileging
postmodern particularism. In line with Cultural Studies (eg, Fiske & Hartley 1978), McKee
contrasts the liberal and plebeian variants of the public sphere, preferring the plebeian one on the
account of the possibility it opens up for different popular groups to make their voices heard. The
possibility of some kind of a universal or collectively binding identity is foreclosed. Or, to put the
same idea in a communicative idiom, no universal language or system of expression exists, and
every section of society is bound by its own idiolect, which, for McKee, makes translation a
crucial instance of social communication. Accepting the universal pretensions of the liberal
tradition, Alexander, in contrast, defines them not in terms of a general idea of humanity, like
Habermas, but in those of a moral idea of solidarity, centred on civil society. For Alexander, there
7 Despite the – at the surface – perfunctory nature of Alexander’s encounter with early Habermas, the acumen of his
exposition can be appreciated when compared, eg, with Nancy Fraser’s (2009) all too one-sided introduction to
Strukturwandel.
8exist in modern societies commonly felt moral sentiments and widely shared cultural conceptions
which mitigate the group egoism of particular interests and enhance intergroup solidarity. And
what is more, there is also a language for this, based on cultural codes and articulated in
narratives, factual and fictive.
What makes Alexander’s position convincing, in relation to McKee but also to early
Habermas, is its historical grounding. One of the analytical and normative weaknesses of McKee’s
conception of working-class culture is its ignorance of working-class history. For McKee, the
labour movement was not a social movement orienting towards political change and organising
itself in political, economic and cultural associations of various kinds, in which it was motivated
by ideas of universal equality and classless society, not those dominated by sectoral interests.
From McKee’s presentist perspective nothing of this is relevant, and what remains is an ahistorical
equation of commercial popular culture with the plebeian ethos. Alexander’s case is more
compelling, also in view of Habermas, as he shows that the moral foundations of civil  society –
implying both radical individualism and comprehensive collectivism – have a long genealogy in
Western history. One aspect of Habermas’s Marxist modernism in Strukturwandel is that he is
unwilling to accord any positive determinacy to factors preceding the bourgeois society.8 This
seems to  apply  to  his  concept  of  the  cultural  public  sphere  too:  had  he  taken  Aristotle’s Poetics
more seriously, he might have reconsidered the novelty of the dynamics of novel reading.
(2) Whatever the historical specificy of modern narrative forms, they have a
privileged place in Habermas’s argumentation for the cultural side of public life. The newspaper
and the novel are what the bourgeoisie needs to give voice to public opinion: the newspaper in the
conversational or debating format and the novel in the story-telling one. The one is directed towards
immediate political action and the other towards the generation of the kind of subjects capable of
participating in politics, even if in part only in principle.9 The gap between them is, for Habermas,
narrowed by the practice of criticism which introduces argumentative strategies, in contrast to
narrative ones, into the discourse of cultural public sphere.
The basic problem with McKee’s interpretation of Strukturwandel lies in ist inability
not only to distinguish between the political and the cultural spheres of the public arena, but also to
grasp the semi-public and semi-private nature of both. For Habermas, the peculiarity of the
bourgeois-liberal public life, in contrast to its predecessors, is that private matters gain public
8 Later, in Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus (1973), Habermas admits that religion has helped to consolidate
the legitimacy of the bourgeois society, but he regards religion as a residual phenomenon, a sign of the fact that the
bourgeois society is unable to stand on its own feet.
9significance, both in their political and cultural sense. Political action is about how to regulate
privately organised economy, and cultural expression is about how to conduct private life. Both
need the media of mass communication because it is only through them that the generality required
by the humanist-universal ideal of a public of free and equal participants can be secured. The
problem at this point is how narrative forms and cultural criticism can contribute to this goal.
McKee pays special attention neither to narrative form nor to cultural criticism,
although he subscribes to the idea, which is one of Habermas’s main points about the bourgeois
conception of culture, that “[W]e are offered identities by public communication” (McKee 2005,
58). Of course, it is arguable whether story-telling has the kind of personality- and community-
supporting effects commonly attributed to it in the republican tradition, to which Habermas belongs.
Given the ‘narrative turn’ of the past few decades, one is inclined to take Habermas’s side on this
issue. Still, McKee, and with him the whole popular culture movement endorsed by Cultural
Studies, is right in emphasising the decreasing significance of high culture, narrative and non-
narrative, in social life. That the relation between high and low has been reversed is a commonplace
nowadays, also outside Cultural Studies. And it is here that Alexander may serve as a fruitful
mediator between Habermas and McKee.
There are two major assets relevant for an analysis of the narrative public sphere in
Alexander’s reading of Strukturwandel. First, Alexander has no difficulty in getting the relation
between  the  political  and  cultural  public  spheres  straight,  and,  second,  he  is  highly  aware  of  the
great difference between the Marxist Habermas of the 1960s and the Habermas of discourse ethics a
couple of decades later, preferring on sociological grounds the former to the latter. Quite like the
young Habermas Alexander makes a case for the political meaning of mass media, both factual and
fictive. What he adds to Habermas is, in the spirit of the cultural turn, the emphasis on the narrative
forms of all public communication, whether news or television serials. It is through telling stories of
actual and imaginary persons and events that the cultural codes underlying social solidarity find
concrete expression and have an effect on people’s emotional attachments and attitudes. Instead of a
general aesthetic education to humanity we have a more specific narrative education to citizenship.
What both McKee and Alexander overlooks in Strukturwandel is  the  function  of
cultural critics as mediators between the world of culture and its ordinary receivers. It was no
coincidence that the institution of criticism was born during the 18th century and became an
essential part of the new emerging bourgeois cultural public sphere (Hohendahl 1982; Eagleton
9 Habermas maintains, in accordance with historical studies, that the majority of the readership of novels were women,
and they were politically disenfranchised. (Still, what is not commonly observed is that the early Habermas stresses
feminine aspects of the cultural public sphere.)
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1984). But the proponents of the plebeian public sphere routinely ignore it, maybe because popular
culture did not give rise to a similar institution, or because in a cultural environment diffused with
relativistic  sentiments  there  is  no  need  for  a  principled  discussion  about  cultural  works  and  the
criteria used in their judgmenet. While McKee’s silence is understandable, Alexander might have
given a second thought to a public debate about narrative forms. In this respect, the Habermas
original still carries the day.
(3) Among the many implications of the political/cultural divide in terms of public
sphere, Habermas’s distinction between the spectatorial and the discussive mode of media
participation is one of the most important. As such, it reflects the dual meaning of the concept of
public, referring to its political and cultural halves (see also Ruby 2007). The political/cultural
divide also makes understandable the parameters of the debate, conducted in media studies during
the past few decades, on the comparative merits of Walter Lippmann and John Dewey. As usually
construed, Lippmann is taken as an example of a passivist conception of democracy, relegating
citizens to the margins of politics, whereas Dewey’s position is given as a paradigm of democratic
activism.10 The stylised opposition, however, conceals many affinities between their positions. And
it is here that the idea of spectatorial democracy, or the new cultural interest in politics, of which
Strukturwandel provides an early instance, may assist in making the point.
Cultural Studies has here paved the way for conceptualising media reception as
political participation, a view emphatically shared by McKee, but also in line with Alexander’s kind
of culturalism. Like young Habermas, McKee and Alexander think that democracy is predicated on
the kind of people its support requires, and this has to do with certain frames of mind and codes of
behaviour. What unites the three is the premise that cultural reception, such as reading novels and
watching news on television, is paramount in helping individuals construct their identities, and what
divides them into two blocs is the relevance accorded to popular media. One may stress the
discontinuity more than the continuity between Habermas, on one hand, and McKee and Alexander,
on the other, but I would like to conclude by following the affirmative line.
Confronted with the new political reality of 20th century America, which arguably
differed  so  much  from  what  the  framers  of  the  U.S.  Constitution  had  to  face,  Lippmann  (1925)
conceived of liberal democratic polity in terms of a division of tasks between acting and spectating.
It is the task of the political system, government at its centre, to act, and it is the task of the voters to
see that the political system serves them well. What is required of citizens as spectators, capacity for
judgment, is in principle no less demanding than what the political action in the systemic sense calls
10 This is the interpretive line initiated especially by James W. Carey. As for rehabilitating Lippmann, see besides my
own contribution (Malmberg 2009) also Schudson (2008).
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for of its practitioners; anyway, it is an invaluable art that you can master in varying degrees, which
underscores the civic duty of spectators not to assume their role too lightly.
Lippmann had in mind the political public sphere, but a similar case can be made for
the cultural one. Here early Habermas joins forces with McKee and Alexander. The analysis of the
cultural undercurrents of politics, so closely knit together with the study of mass communication in
contemporary societies, links the kind of Frankfurt School thought provided by Strukturwandel,
which is too often considered an anathema by latter day progressives, to contemporary cultural
studies of media in the broad sense. What I have tried to achieve by a return to Strukturwandel,
hopefully correcting some misunderstandings in today’s mainstream English-language media
research, is to make such inter-theoretical triangulation more feasible. There are, admittedly, limits
to this, forcing us to make a choice between basic political world-views. In contrast to what McKee
insistently claims, the alternatives are not those of modern versus postmodern options. Rather, we
have to make up our minds about gravitating either towards the republican or communitarian camp
of  Habermas  and  McKee,  or  towards  the  liberal  camp  of  Lippmann  and  Alexander.  It  is  the
dialogue between them that must now be tackled with more systematically in our field.
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